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THE INTEREST OF THE COMMUNITY IN A
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
Increasing numbers of married individuals are financing
their spouses' professional school educations with community
funds, an "investment" which they hope will secure a brighter
family financial future. These community funds may also pro-
vide support for the student spouse who foregoes wages and is
essentially a dependent while in school.' If such marriages are
terminated subsequent to the completion of the student
spouse's professional education, unfairness will result if that
spouse is allowed to simply walk away from the marriage with
the enhanced earning potential occasioned by the education
without recognizing the community's interests resulting there-
from. However, most courts in other states2 which have ruled
upon claims by the supporting spouse to a proprietary interest
in the student spouse's professional education have refused to
recognize the education as "property" which is subject to divi-
sion upon dissolution of the marriage.3 This comment suggests
that a professional education should be categorized as
"property" which, if properly classified as community property
1. Of course, community funds and labor may also be expended in earning un-
dergraduate or non-professional degrees. However, this comment assumes that a per-
son with a college degree is at least "employable," even in these days of high unemploy-
ment. In addition, professional educations are generally regarded as aids to the acquisi-
tion of higher-paying jobs. Thus, a couple "invests" in a professional education by
foregoing the wages which the "employable" spouse could otherwise be earning, with
an eye toward the enhanced earning potential which a professional education provides.
Because of the "investment" nature of the quest for a professional education, it may
be distinguished from undergraduate studies which many regard as a necessary prere-
quisite to initial "employability."
2. See the discussion of these cases in text at notes 16-40, infra.
3. Though some of the courts have recognized a monetary interest in the educa-
tion on the part of the supporting spouse, only Kentucky has recognized the education
as "property" and most have expressly rejected this contention. See text at note 35,
infra.
4. Property classification as community or separate is currently governed by
articles 2334 and 2402 of the Louisiana Civil Code. New legislation, enacted in 1978
but not effective until January 1, 1980, will replace these and the other matrimonial
regime articles of the Code. LA. R.S. 9:2838-40 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 627, § 1. See note 76, infra. See also text at notes 71-83, infra, for an in-depth
discussion of principles of classification of property.
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under the Louisiana Civil Code4 or the Revised Statutes,5 will
allow a more just property settlement upon dissolution of the
marriage.
The Division of Marital Property
Procedure for the division of marital property differs from
state to state; therefore, different considerations are applicable
to the issue of whether a professional education should be re-
garded as property according to which state is making the de-
termination. The brief summary of such procedures which fol-
lows will demonstrate how Louisiana's unique procedures pres-
ent a considerable theoretical roadblock to the recognition of
the professional education as property.
In any state, community or non-community, the spouses
are free to stipulate a property settlement.' The spouses can
simply stipulate the agreed upon settlement in court proceed-
ings and the court will take no further action on the matter.
However, the student spouse will be unlikely to stipulate that
his7 spouse is entitled to any share in his education, since one's
education is not the type of asset that a layman would instinc-
tively recognize as "property" susceptible of "division."
Unfortunately, as at least one court has noted,8 the profes-
sional education and the concomitant increase in earning po-
tential may be the only significant marital asset when the
spouses part company shortly after the student spouse com-
pletes his education, at a time when the increased earning
potential has not yet been realized in the accumulation of ma-
terial wealth. Thus, the courts have seen and will continue to
see disputes concerning the division of property when the sup-
5. See note 4, supra. See also notes 77 and 80, infra, for texts of pertinent sec-
tions.
6. In any state, courts may not properly rule upon matters not before them. The
spouses may stipulate a property settlement just as parties in any action may stipulate
the facts in order to dispose of uncontested matters. Such uncontested matters are
simply not presented to the courts for rulings.
7. Hereinafter, the husband will be regarded as the student spouse for consist-
ency of pronoun usage. However, the principles expounded in this comment are also
applicable to female student spouses.
8. In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1978) (Carrigan, J., dissent
ing).
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porting spouse demands her rightful share of the professional
education. When such disputes arise, and a court is called upon
to order a division of marital property, the court may reach its
decision by employing one of three basic methods, depending
upon the state in which the court sits.
First, all of the non-community property states and five'
of the eight community property states have statutes requiring
the trial judge to "equitably" divide the marital property of the
spouses in the absence of a stipulated property agreement."'
These states will hereinafter be referred to as "Type I" states.
In these states, a finding that the professional education is
property is not absolutely necessary, since "equitable" prop-
erty divisions are based upon the trial judge's consideration of
"all the circumstances." Thus, the fact that one spouse has
labored to help the other to attain an education which has
increased his earning capacity may persuade the judge that the
supporting spouse should get a larger share of the marital prop-
erty for the division to be equitable. If the court were to find
the education to be property, the value" of that property,
which the student spouse would be "taking with him," could
be recognized by awarding more of the other property to the
supporting spouse. In either case, whether the education is
determined to be property or not, Louisiana cannot deal with
the issue in this manner because of its own method of division
of property as will be seen below.
A second basic method of judicial division of marital prop-
erty prevails in the community property states of California
and New Mexico, which will hereinafter be referred to as "Type
II" states. In these states, community property is divided by
the trial court under what has been termed the "aggregate
9. Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Texas and Washington. See W. REPPY & W. DE Fu-
NIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 464 (1st ed. 1975).
10. Non-community property states: see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 14-10-113(2)
(1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1938).
Community property states: see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (1875), which allows
the court to make a "just" assignment of property rights when a divorce decree is
rendered on the ground of adultery or extreme cruelty.
11. See text at. notes 93-94, infra, for a discussion of valuation of a professional
education.
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theory of community ownership."'" Under this theory the judge
in these states could award, for example, a community automo-
bile to one spouse, the shares of community stock of equal
value to the other spouse, and so on. Unlike "Type I" states,
"Type II" states require a finding that the education is prop-
erty, since "equitable" unequal divisions are not authorized.
Nevertheless, once an education is classified as property and
its value is determined, the judge would be empowered to
"award" the professional education to the student spouse and
community assets of equal value to the supporting spouse.
Louisiana, however, does not employ this method of division.
The third basic method of dividing marital property is
unique to Louisiana. When the spouses cannot agree upon a
property settlement and petition the court for a partition," the
court is authorized only to partition community property
equally in kind or by licitation. 4 Partition in kind may only be
ordered with regard to community property which is capable
of such division, as where a parcel of land may be divided in
half. Community property incapable of being divided equally
is subject to partition by licitation. That is, the court orders a
judicial sale of all such property and the spouses divide the
proceeds equally. 5 Louisiana, therefore, lacks the ability to
employ the equitable distribution method used by "Type I"
states or the aggregate theory used by "Type II" states since
all community property is either physically divided equally or
sold and the proceeds divided equally. This fact leads to the
aforementioned legal roadblock to the classification of the pro-
fessional education as community property in Louisiana: a pro-
fessional education does not seem to be partitionable either in
kind or by licitation. The supporting spouse cannot physically
be given half of an education, nor can one's education be sold.-
Thus, if a professional education is recognized as community
property, what could the courts do with it?
12. W. REPPY & W. DE FUNIAK, supra note 9. All other states besides Louisiana
subscribe to the "aggregate theory" as well, but are not limited to equal division of
assets. See text at note 10, supra.
13. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 4601-08.
14. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 4606-07.
15. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4606.
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This question need not be answered unless Louisiana
courts are willing to recognize the education as property and
assign it a value. Thus, the writer will return to this question
after considering why the education should be property and
how it should be valued. First, however, it may be helpful to
consider the decisions of other states which have previously
faced this issue.
Resolutions in Other Jurisdictions
At this time, only one state has specifically recognized the
professional education of the student spouse as property sub-
ject to "division" upon dissolution of the marriage or com-
munity.'6 However, most of the other states which have faced
this issue have been able to use their particular methods of
dividing martial property, as discussed in the preceding sec-
tion, to protect the rights of the supporting spouse without the
necessity of finding that the education is property. Thus, the
following cases will be analyzed in light of the methods of divi-
sion employed in the particular state where the decision was
rendered.
California, a "Type II" state, 7 is the only state which nei-
ther recognizes the education as property nor protects the sup-
porting spouse's interests by employing its divisional proce-
dure, the "aggregate method."' 8 In the first case squarely pres-
enting the issue, Todd v. Todd, 'I the supporting spouse claimed
that her husband's legal education, which had been partially
funded by her community earnings, was a "community asset"
to be taken into account in valuing the community estate.2"'
The court rejected this claim, stating that even if the education
could be viewed as community property, a proposition which
it termed "extremely doubtful," it is "manifestly . . . of such
a character that a monetary value for division cannot be placed
upon it.""1 In so holding the court seemed to confuse the
16. See Inman v. Inman, 47 U.S.L.W. 2582 (Ky. App. 1979).
17. See text at note 12, supra.
18. See text at note 12, supra.
19. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
20. Id. at 790, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
21. Id. at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
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difficulty in valuing the education with the possibility of mak-
ing such a valuation. Upon making an adequate valuation, the
court could have employed the "aggregate theory" to award the
education to the student spouse and assets of equal value to the
supporting spouse. As it is, however, the effect of the above-
cited language is that, even if the education is property,"2 its
zero value prevents the supporting spouse from being entitled
to any off-setting assets upon dissolution. The court noted, in
justification of its conclusion, that the spouses' community as-
sets were the "results" of the legal education such that the
supporting spouse "realized the value therefrom" 3 in the
award of property to her. This justification is inapposite in the
situation in which spouses divorce shortly after the student
spouse completes his education, before any significant assets
have been accumulated which would allow the supporting
spouse to "realize" the value of the education through a divi-
sion of property. Nevertheless, the "aggregate theory" at least
affords California a solution to the problem that is unavailable
to Louisiana, despite the fact that the court in Todd failed to
adopt such a solution. 4
Colorado, a "Type I" non-community property state,25 was
the first state to recognize the rights of the supporting spouse
in her husband's professional education in Greer v. Greer.2"
However, the rationale behind the court's ruling in Greer is
unclear.27 The case does not hold that the order to the husband
22. The court later stated that "[alt best, education is an intangible property
right, the value of which, because of its character, cannot have a monetary value
placed upon it for division between spouses." Id. at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135. The trial
court had previously held the value of the education to be zero. Id. at 791, 78 Cal.
Rptr. at 134.
23. Id.
24. The Todd case was criticized in Comment, The Interest of the Community
in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REv. 590 (1974). Nevertheless, the Todd case
was recently followed in In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
25. See note 10, supra.
26. 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973).
27. The supporting spouse, in an earlier divorce decree, had been awarded $150
per month "alimony" pursuant to a Colorado statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-5 (1963),
which authorized the court to make orders for alimony and other such orders as are
warranted relative to the division of property. The "alimony" was to be paid by the
husband for a four-year period, corresponding to the four years in which the wife had
funded the husband's medical school education, after which the payments were to
1979] 1111
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to make payments to his wife was in settlement of property
rights, nor does it expressly state that the husband's medical
education is property. ' The court did state that the husband's
$150 per month payments "constitute an adjustment in prop-
erty rights," 9 which led a supporting spouse in the later case
of In re Marriage of Graham to cite Greer as authority for the
proposition that her husband's business degree, acquired dur-
ing marriage, was property. In Graham the Colorado Supreme
Court distinguished Greer and held that, although the educa-
tion is not property subject to division,3' it may32 be a factor to
consider in arriving at an equitable property distribution.3 1
Thus, under the Graham rationale, Colorado has employed its
"Type F method of equitably dividing marital property in
order to protect the supporting spouse's rights, obviating the
necessity of finding that the education is property. The other
"Type I" non-community property states which have faced this
issue have resolved it in the same manner as the Colorado court
in Graham.4 Note again, however, that Louisiana does not
terminate. Before the four-year period was up, the wife remarried, whereupon the
husband brought suit to terminate the "alimony" payments. The court refused to
terminate the payments since the payments were not alimony. Noting that the original
order required payment not for "support," which in Colorado is the test for whether a
payment is "alimony," but in view of the wife's funding of her husband's education,
the court stated that the payments "[constituted] an adjustment of property rights
... . as a substitute for, or in lieu of, the wife's rights in the husband's property." 32
Colo. App. at 199, 510 P.2d at 907. However, the court later stated that if the award
constituted "alimony in gross," i.e., " a fixed or determinable sum in connection with
orders entered" pursuant to the statute, the result would not be different since neither
an order to settle property rights nor an order for alimony in gross are terminated by
the subsequent remarriage of the spouse.
28. See note 27, supra.
29. 32 Colo. App. at 199, 510 P.2d at 907.
30. 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
31. Id. at 77.
32. "Where there is marital property to be divided, such contribution to the
education of the other spouse may be taken into consideration by the court." Id. at 78
(emphasis added). Note that the language is discretionary in nature, allowing the court
to consider the contribution of the supporting spouse, but not requiring such a consid-
eration.
33. Id.
34. Kentucky is the only exception. See text at notes 35-39, infra.
The Iowa Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa
1978), cited Graham in ruling that the trial judge should consider a professional educa-
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have the ability to "equitably" divide marital property.
Kentucky is the only state at this time which has expressly
recognized a proprietary interest of the supporting spouse in a
professional education. In Inman v. Inman35 the court placed a
husband's license to practice dentistry into the category of
marital property in recognition of the wife's financing of his
dental school education." Referring to the situation of divorce
following shortly after the completion of the education and
thus at a time when the spouses have accumulated little prop-
erty, the court expressed concern that, under "traditional"
views of what constitutes property, "the spouse who has de-
voted much of the product of several years of labor to an
'investment' in future family prosperity is barred from any
return on his or her investment."3 The court felt that its hold-
ing was necessary to avoid allowing the student spouse to re-
ceive "a windfall of contribution to his or her increased earning
capacity. '38 However, the court indicated that a finding that
an education is property may not be necessary or even desirable
when the spouses have accumulated sufficient marital property
so that an equitable division thereof could do justice between
the spouses.3 1
One may summarize the rulings of the courts in other
states which have treated this issue as follows: the "Type I"
tion in making an equitable property distribution, though the education is not prop-
erty. 263 N.W.2d at 891.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257
(1975), had earlier held that the student spouse's potential earning capacity occasioned
by his professional education is "doubtless a factor to be considered" in fixing an
equitable property distribution, though, again, such earning potential is not property.
66 N.J. at 345, 331 A.2d at 260.
35. 47 U.S.L.W. 2582 (Ky. App. 1979).
36. One should note that the holding that a professional license is property is not
really different from a holding that a professional education is property, or, for that
matter, that a professional degree or its concomitant increase in earning potential is
property. All of the above terms are but variant semantic labels for the same situation.
A degree, a license, or consequential earning potential are all results of the education,
which itself resulted from community labor and funds. Indeed the holding in the
Inman case is clearly based upon the wife's support during the husband's dental
education.
37. 47 U.S.L.W. at 2582.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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states, except Kentucky, protect the supporting spouse ade-
quately only where sufficient marital assets exist for an equita-
ble division; Kentucky, through the ruling in Inman, has the
flexibility to protect the supporting spouse regardless of the
spouses' property accumulation; finally, California does not
recognize or protect the supporting spouse's interests at all,
though it considers the supporting spouse adequately protected
without such a remedy when sufficient property has been accu-
mulated.
In any case, Louisiana cannot avail itself of the division of
property methods which, as in Colorado, allow some protection
for the supporting spouse without the necessity of a finding
that the education is property. However, despite the problems
inherent in classifying an education as property, Louisiana,
like Kentucky, can find that an education is property for the
reasons to be discussed in the following section.
The Professional Education as Property
By and large, the courts in other states have declined to
accord "property" status to a professional education due to
"traditional, narrow concepts of what constitutes 'property."' 4 '
40. It is arguable that Iowa has reached a similar result in In re Marriage of
Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978). See note 34, supra. Though the court in
Horstmann apparently rejected the claim that the husband's law degree was property,
the degree was later referred to as an "asset" of the marriage. In addition, the spouses
had very little marital property, but the wife was awarded $18,000 because of the
husband's increased earning potential resulting from his legal education. Thus, the
court apparently protected this supporting spouse in the absence of an accumulation
of marital property for division, a solution which the other "Type I" states except
Kentucky may not be able to reach.
41. In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1978) (Carrigan, J., dissent-"
ing).
The Colorado Supreme Court in Graham summarized some of these traditional
aspects in holding that a professional degree ii not property. Id. at 77. First, the court
pointed out that the degree "does not have an exchange value or any objective trans-
ferrable value on an open market." Id. This statement is undoubtedly true, but does
it prevent the education (through its degree manifestation) from being classified as
property? It is submitted that it does not, since the term "value" is a relative term
which does not necessarily draw its significance only from the marketplace. For exam-
ple, an old automobile may have depreciated to the point that its "blue book" value
is zero. Because of age and potential mechanical failures, such an automobile may
actually have a market value of zero as well, since no willing buyer could be found. Is
1114
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Admittedly, a professional education is not the sort of thing
that a layman would instinctively recognize as property.
However, Louisiana courts are not bound by "traditional"
common law concepts of property. There is ample civil law
authority for the proposition that one's education, as mani-
fested in its concomitant increase in earning capacity, is a part
of one's patrimony; as a patrimonial asset, it is property which
must be considered in a judicial partition of community prop-
such an automobile incapable of classification as property? Certainly not. One may
argue, however, that this example may be distinguishable in that a car is inherently
capable of being sold, while one cannot sell an education because of its nature. How-
ever, this argument does not address the statement made by the court in Graham,
since the statement merely points out that the degree has no "exchange value" on an
"open market," which undoubtedly many items of property similarly do not have.
Secondly, the court noted that the degree "is personal to the holder." Id. This, in
itself, is not enough to deny property status, since a usufruct, for example, is undenia-
bly personal to the holder. The court added, however, that the degree "terminates on
[the] death of the holder and is not inheritable." Id. Again, this reasoning is faulty
in that a usufruct, which is undoubtedly a property right, also terminates on the death
of the usufructuary and is not inheritable.
The next point made by the court, relying upon traditional notions of what is
"property," is that the degree "cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or
pledged." Id. Once again, this reason is not in itself sufficient to deny property status
to the professional education. The corpus of a "spend-thrift trust," for example, may
not be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged by anyone-the trustees, the
income beneficiaries, or the principal beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the corpus is undeni-
ably property and gives rise to the property rights in the beneficiaries. Thus, non-
transferrability should not be sufficient.
The court also notes that an education or degree "may not be acquired by the mere
expenditure of money." Id. This is true, since one cannot buy an education or degree
but must combine education expenses with diligence and work. Again, however, this
factor should not be sufficient to deny property status, since a laborer, for example,
unquestionably has a property right in his wages, yet does not acquire these wages by
the mere expenditure of money.
Finally, the court observes that the degree is "simply an intellectual achievement
that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property." Suppose, however,
that instead of pursuing a professional education the "student" spouse chooses to write
a book. Is this book not an intellectual achievement which the writer hopes will help
him to acquire property in the future? It certainly is, yet the law will recognize a
property right of the author in his product.
Thus, the court in Graham used a "traditional" property analysis in concluding
that a professional degree is not property. Yet, as discussed above, each reason given
is insufficient in that other things exist which are classified as property despite the fact
that they do not comport with the various criteria cited by the Graham majority. By
and large, the Graham analysis is precisely the analysis used in the other cases which
deny property status to the professional education.
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erty. In fact, several other things have already been recognized
as property by Louisiana courts, though they may not be in-
stinctively recognized as such by a layman.
Patrimony
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently stated that a
''patrimonial asset" means property "in ordinary language, ''42
for purposes of determining what is property subject to judicial
partition upon dissolution of the community. Thus, a finding
that the education is a patrimonial asset will be equivalent to
a finding that the education is property regardless of the
"theoretical nature of the right. '4 3
"Patrimony, according to traditional civilian doctrine, is
an economic unit consisting of the sum total of a person's assets
and liabilities."" Aubry and Rau, credited with formulating
the "classical" theory of patrimony, have written that "the
idea of patrimony is logically deduced from the idea of person-
ality . . . the patrimony is the emanation of personality, and
the expression of the juridical capacity with which a person, as
such, is invested."' 5 The French consider a person's patrimony
to be made up of the sum total of the person's "patrimonial
rights and obligations, i.e., elements susceptible of pecuniary
evaluation." 6 All rights and obligations which are not suscepti-
ble of pecuniary evaluation are extra-patrimonial. 7
The Louisiana law dealing with patrimony has until re-
cently been "a most neglected part of the law jurispruden-
tially."' 8 However, recent decisions of the supreme court have
emphasized the importance of the concept. In Creech v. Capi-
tol Mack,"8 former Justice Barham defined "patrimony" as
"the total mass of existing or potential rights and liabilities
42. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161, 163 (La. 1977).
43. Id.
44. A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 73 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAw TREATISE 212
(1967).
45. 9 C. AuBRY rr C. RAu, Daorr CIVIL FRANCAIS § 573 (5th ed. 1917), quoted in
A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 44, at § 74.
46. A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 44, at § 78.
47. Id. at § 84.
48. Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. 1973).
49. 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
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attached to a person for the satisfaction of his economic
needs."5' The preceding discussion leads one to conclude that,
in Louisiana, if an existing or potential asset or right is suscep-
tible of pecuniary valuation, it is a patrimonial asset or right
and is thus "property." 5'
The following enumeration of things which Louisiana
courts have held to be property will demonstrate how the above
"test" for "patrimoniality" or "property" was or could have
been applied.52 First, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recog-
nized, and it is now settled law, that a cause of action for
personal injury is property.53 Clearly, a cause of action for per-
sonal injury is an existing right which accrues at the time of
injury, and it is certainly capable of being valued in terms of
damages. Thus, a cause of action, though it is incorporeal54 and
somewhat theoretical in nature, is correctly recognized as prop-
erty in Louisiana. The French agree that accrued causes of
action are patrimonial assets.55
Secondly, the interests of the community in pension
plans,56 retirement annuities,57 and profit-sharing plans" have
been recognized as property by Louisiana courts, despite the
relative difficulty in evaluating such concepts. These concepts
areexamples of potential rights which, though difficult to eval-
uate, are nevertheless susceptible of such evaluation.
Thirdly, the right of the community in a contingent fee
contract has been held to be property." This too is
50. Id. at 504.
51. The court in Creech recognized that susceptibility of evaluation is the theo-
retical test of whether an asset or liability is patrimonial. Id.
52. The interest of the community in such property will be considered in the
following section. See text at notes 71-83, infra.
53. Heyes v. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of New York, 255 La. 127, 229 So. 2d 724
(1969).
54. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 44, at § 13.
55. Id. at § 75.
56. Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978); Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So. 2d 461
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 295 So. 2d 809 (La. 1974).
57. T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); Messers-
mith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956).
58. T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); Laffitte
v. Laffitte, 232 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
59. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
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"theoretical" property, a potential right which is susceptible of
pecuniary valuation at a later time.
Fourthly, the ability to work60 and the right to pursue em-
ployment and to conduct business6 ' are property rights in
Louisiana. This is so despite serious dispute among legal schol-
ars. Carbonnier, for example, wrote that inasmuch as patri-
mony includes future acquisitions, credit may and should be
extended to an impecunious individual who has the ability to
work. 2 Thus, Carbonnier believes that a person's ability to
work should be regarded as a patrimonial asset. 3 Professor
Yiannopoulos disagrees, and feels that a person's ability to
work, "in contrast to earned salaries," is not a patrimonial
asset.6" Nevertheless, Louisiana courts have in fact held such
things to be property as existing rights.6 5 Though intangibles,
such as enjoyment of one's work, may be present in an attempt
to evaluate such rights, it is clear that one's right to work may
almost always be evaluated by consideration of the earnings
resulting from such work.
Next, Louisiana courts have recognized that the goodwill
of a business is a property right." This right may easily be
evaluated by simply assuming that the value it commands in
a sale of the business is in fact its value.
Finally, and perhaps most strangely, an author's rights in
his unpublished letters were recognized as a property right by
a Louisiana court. 7 Perhaps this right would be the most diffi-
cult to evaluate in a pecuniary manner of all the aformentioned
property rights.
The Professional Education as a Patrimonial Asset
As is readily seen from a consideration of the foregoing
discussion, quite a few incorporeal, intangible, "theoretical"
60. Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919).
61. West v. Town of Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So. 2d 665 (1968).
62. See 2 J. CARBONNEER, Daorr CIL n, 2 (1957), cited in A. YUNNOPOuLOs, supra
note 42, at § 75 n.32.
63. Id.
64. A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 44 at 75.
65. See notes 60 & 61, supra, and accompanying text.
66. Succession of Jurisich, 224 La. 325, 69 So. 2d 361 (La. 1953).
67. Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (O.S.) 297 (La. 1811).
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rights have been properly recognized as property by Louisiana
courts. While a layman might not immediately consider his
ability to work or his interests in his private letters to be prop-
erty, the law will nevertheless recognize property rights in such
things. The question is whether the professional education, or
its concomitant increase in earning potential, may be properly
considered as a patrimonial asset and thus property.
Legal scholarship and jurisprudence indicate that two
basic requirements must be met for such a finding: first, the
education or the earning potential must be an existing or po-
tential asset or right; secondly, this asset or right must be
susceptible of pecuniary valuation. As to the first requirement,
the earning capacity resulting from a professional education is
certainly a potential right,"8 though the better view would be
to recognize the education as an existing asset. Either way, this
first requirement is satisfied. As to the second requirement, the
education or the earning potential will admittedly be difficult
to value. However, many of the forms of property discussed
above are somewhat difficult to value, a factor which should
not and does not affect their recognition as property. 9 In the
case of earning potential, it would be incongruous to consider
this asset insusceptible of pecuniary valuation when, if the
student spouse were to die shortly after graduation as a result
of a delict, a court would be able to value the very same earning
potential in reaching a determination of damages for lost earn-
ings.70 A more detailed analysis of factors which must be con-
sidered by a court in valuing the education will be deferred
until later. It is submitted, however, that the education or
68. Note also the similarity between this concept and the "right to pursue em-
ployment" concept which was recognized as a property right in West v. Town of
Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So. 2d 665 (1968).
69. In Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977), the Louisiana Supreme Court
recognized the husband's contingent fee contracts as property without regard to the
actual value of the contracts. Noting that "[ain attorney's rights under a contingent.
contract, whatever their nature [i.e., whether "existing" or "potential"], clearly have
pecuniary value," the court held the contracts to be patrimonial assets and thus
"property," without an inquiry into the actual value of the contracts. Id. at 165.
70. See, e.g., Robinson v. Graves, 343 So. 2d 147 (La. 1977). In Robinson, the
court noted that damages for loss of future earnings are proper even though "somewhat
speculative" in nature. Id. at 149.
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earning potential is a potential right that is susceptible of pecu-
niary valuation, and is thus a patrimonial asset, or "property."
The Professional Education as Community Property
Having established that the professional education should
be regarded as property, three further inquiries must be consid-
ered and resolved. First, when should such property be classi-
fied as community property? Secondly, when the education is
recognized as community property subject to judicial partition,
how can it be partitioned in light of its apparent inherent insus-
ceptibility of partition either in kind or by licitation? Finally,
if it is partitionable, how should a court compute its value?
Classification as Separate or Community Property
Articles 233411 and 240272 of the Louisiana Civil Code dic-
71. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2334 provides:
The property of married persons is divided into separate and common prop-
erty.
Separate property is that which either party brings into the marriage, or
acquires during the marriage with separate funds, or by inheritance, or by dona-
tion made to him or her particularly. The earnings of the wife when living
separate and apart from her husband although not separated by judgment of
court, her earnings when carrying on a business, trade, occupation or industry
separate from her husband, actions for damages resulting from offenses and
quasi offenses and the property purchased with all funds thus derived, are her
separate property.
Actions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi offenses suffered by
the husband, living separate and apart from his wife, by reason of fault on her
part, sufficient for separation or divorce shall be his separate property.
Common property is that which is acquired by the husband and wife during
marriage, in any manner different from that above declared. But when the title
to community property stands in the name of the wife, it cannot be leased,
mortgaged or sold by the husband without her written authority or consent.
Where the title to immovable property stands in the names of both the
husband and wife, it may not be leased, mortgaged or sold by the husband
without the wife's written authority or consent.
Where the title to community immovable property declared to be the family
home stands in the name of the husband alone it may not be leased, mortgaged
or sold without the wife's written authority or consent.
The limitation on the husband described in the two immediately preceding
paragraphs shall not apply where the wife has made a declaration by authentic
act that her authority or consent are not required for such lease, sale or mortgage
and has filed such declaration in the mortgage and conveyance records of the
parish in which the property is situated.
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tate which "property" or "effects" are considered community
and which are considered separate. In pertinent part, article
2334 provides that separate property of the spouses includes
property brought into the marriage, property acquired during
the marriage with separate funds, or property acquired through
inheritance or donation made to the spouse particularly.7 3
Community property consists of all property acquired in any
manner during the marriage other than those acquisitions
which are expressly designated as separate property under the
article." Article 2402 elaborates upon what acquisitions are
considered community property. In this case, the key language
in article 2402 provides that "the produce of the reciprocal
industry and labor of both husband and wife" 5 is community
property.
Under Act 627 of 1978,"e the pertinent provisions to the
case at hand are basically the same. Section 2838 provides that
things acquired during the community's existence "through
The declaration may be general as to all such property or it may specify
property to which it shall or shall not apply. If the declaration so provides, it
may apply generally to property which may be acquired in the future, but a
contrary declaration of withdrawal of her authority or consent by the wife may
be made and recorded.
72. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2402 provides:
This partnership or community consists of the profits of all the effects of
which the husband has the administration and enjoyment, either of right or in
fact, of the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both husband and
wife, and of the estate which they may acquire during the marriage, either by
donations made jointly to them both, or by purchase, or in any other similar
way, even although the purchase be only in the name of one of the two and not
of both, because in that case the period of time when the purchase is made is
alone attended to, and not the person who made the purchase. But damages
resulting from personal injuries to the wife shall not form part of this com-
munity, but shall always be and remain the separate property of the wife and
recoverable by herself alone; provided where the injuries sustained by the wife
result in her death, the right to recover damages shall be as now provided for
by existing laws.
73. The other types of separate property, for example the wife's earnings while
living separate and apart or damages for offenses or quasi-offenses, are clearly not
relevant in this context.
74. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2334.
75. LA. CIv. CoDn art. 2402.
76. LA. R.S. 9:2831-56 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. Act
627 enacted a major reform of matrimonial regimes law.
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the effort, skill or industry of either spouse" are community
property." This provision may be somewhat broader than the
provision of article 2402 in that "things acquired" through
community effort, skill or industry is literally broader than the
"produce" of such activities. 8
In applying these provisions to the professional education
in order to determine its classification, one must, of course,
consider the particular facts in a given situation. If, for exam-
ple, the spouses marry after the completion of the student's
education, it is clear that the property right arising from the
education should be considered the separate property of the
graduate spouse since it would be "property brought into the
marriage." However, in situations in which at least some, or
all, of the education is "acquired" during the existence of the
community, the education should to the extent acquired during
marriage be considered community property, as a "thing ac-
quired" or the "produce" of the reciprocal industry and labor
of both spouses. Thus, if the student spouse begins his profes-
sional education prior to marriage but completes it during the
existence of the community, the property right arising there-
77. LA. R.S. 9:2838 (Supp. 1978) provides:
Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community
property. The community property comprises:
(1) Things acquired during the legal regime through the effort, skill, or
industry or either spouse;
(2) Things acquired with community assets;
(3) Things acquired with separate and community assets unless classified
as separate in R.S. 9:2839. When things so acquired are classified as community
property, reimbursement is due from community assets for the amount of the
separate investment;
(4) Things donated or bequeathed to the spouses jointly;
(5) Fruits and revenues of community property;
(6) Fruits and revenues of separate property except as otherwise provided
in R.S. 9:2839;
(7) Damages awarded for loss of or injury to a community asset;
(8) All other things not classified as separate property by other provisions
of this Part.
Property possessed by either spouse during the community regime is pre-
sumed to be community property, but neither spouse shall be precluded from
proving its separate character.
78. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1978 Regular Ses-
sion-Matrimonial Regimes, 39 LA. L. REv. 136 (1979).
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from should be community property in proportion to the
"amount" of the education which is acquired due to the indus-
try or effort of the student spouse and the investment of com-
munity funds by the supporting spouse.
It is submitted that the community will always have a
property interest in a professional education acquired wholly or
partially during its existence, even if the education is funded
by the separate funds of the student spouse, since the com-
munity industry and labor of the supporting spouse is always
expended in acquiring the education." A professional educa-
tion is not property which can simply be purchased; it requires
the investment of long hours of study and effort on the part of
the student spouse in addition to whatever funds are needed for
books, tuition, and other fees. The provisions of article 2334
and section 2839 of Act 627s that state that things acquired by
the spouse with separate funds or assets are separate property
obviously do not contemplate a situation where community
labor and industry is also expended in the acquisition of the
thing. The solution to this problem may be derived by analogy
to the treatment of life insurance policies in Louisiana law. The
jurisprudence is uniform in recognizing that a life insurance
policy purchased during the existence of the community is
community property, regardless of the funds used to acquire
it.s8 If the policy were acquired with separate funds, the spouse
79. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976),
expressed a belief that articles 2402, 2334, and 2405, when read together, declare the
legislature's intent that "all property [in the broad sense of the word] is to form part
of the community, if acquired during the marriage ..... Id. at 165 (emphasis
added).
80. LA. R.S. 9:2839 (Supp. 1978) provides in pertinent part:
A spouse owns his or her separate property to the exclusion of the other.
The separate property of the spouses comprises:
(3) Things acquired with separate and community assets when the
amount of the community investment is inconsequential. In such cases reim-
bursement is due from the separate estate for the amount of the community
investment.
Note that, in the case of a professional education, the community "investment"
of the labor and industry of the student spouse can hardly be called "inconsequential."
81. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So, 2d 12 (1956); Succession of Mendoza,
288 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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whose separate funds were expended may be entitled to a reim-
bursement, 8 but this does not affect the classification of the
policy as community property. Likewise, a similar finding
would be justified in regard to the professional education: the
property right is community property to the extent acquired
during the community since it is a product of community labor
and industry, and any investment in its acquisition with the
separate funds of either spouse should give rise to a right of
reimbursement but should not affect the classification of the
property.8
Perhaps the preceding principles may be more clearly ex-
plained through the use of hypotheticals. Assume the following
facts, which will then be subjected to several variations: the
husband earns a law degree in three years, during which time
he attended school and did not work.
Variation One: The husband completes his three-year
study and acquires his law degree prior to marriage. As men-
tioned previously, in this instance the legal education should
be his separate property as property "brought into the mar-
riage."
Variation Two: The spouses marry after the husband's
first year of law school. During the next two years, the wife
82. The principle of reimbursement is based upon LA. Civ. ConE art. 2408, which
provides as follows:
When the separate property of either the husband or the wife has been
increased or improved during the marriage, the other spouse, or his or her heirs,
shall be entitled to the reward of one half of the value of the increase or ameliora-
tions, if it be proved that the increase or ameliorations be the result of the
common labor, expenses or industry; but there shall be no reward due, if it be
proved that the increase is due only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise
in the value of property, or to the chances of trade.
Though the article addresses itself only to the situation where the separate property
of either spouse has been improved during the marriage, the jurisprudence has long
recognized that the article also requires a reimbursement to a spouse whose separate
funds have "improved" the community. See Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied 250 La. 920, 199 So. 2d 922 (1967).
The provisions of Act 627 are to the same effect. See LA. R.S. 9:2839(3) (Supp.
1978). For the text of Revised Statutes 9:2839(3), see note 75, supra. See also LA. R.S.
9:2852-54 (Supp. 1978) (detailed summary of when reimbursement is due under the
new law).
83. Of course, if the investment of separate funds is a donation, no right of
reimbursement is appropriate.
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works, though the actual school tuition, fees, etc., are provided
by the husband's parents. In this situation, "two-years worth"
of the husband's community labor and industry have been ex-
pended in quest of the law degree. One of the years, however,
was expended by the husband "on his own time." Thus, the
community interest should be recognized as two-thirds of the
value 8 of the property right in the education. The husband
may be entitled to a reimbursement for the two years of funds
if he can prove that the funds were his separate property as
donations made to him particularly. This factor, however, will
not disturb the community classification to the extent of the
expenditure of community labor and industry in its acquisi-
tion.
Variation Three: The spouses marry prior to the husband's
entering law school and divorce shortly after his completion of
his education. Clearly, the entire value of the professional edu-
cation is community property in this situation.
Variation Four: The spouses marry prior to the husband's
entering law school. In December of his senior year, the hus-
band accepts a high-paying job with a prestigious law firm. In
January, he abandons his wife. She gets a legal separation from
bed and board in March. He completes his education in May.
They divorce two years later.
In this situation, the community interest should be recog-
nized to the extent of the husband's investment of community
labor and industry, despite the fact that the education was not
completed at the time the community was dissolved. This solu-
tion finds authority through an analogy to the cases of Sims v.
Sims s5 and Due v. Due."' In Sims, the wife's share of the com-
munity interest in the husband's pension plan was recognized
despite the fact that, at the time of divorce, the husband's
rights to the pension had not yet vested. In Due, the wife's
share of the community interest in the husband's contingency
fee contracts was recognized even though the husband was not
yet entitled to any proceeds from the contracts and in fact
84. As mentioned previously, the evaluation of the professional education will be
considered in a later section. See text at notes 93-94, infra.
85. 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
86. 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
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would never be entitled to any proceeds if the actions upon
which the contracts were based did not succeed. Thus, in the
instant situation, the community interest in the professional
education should be recognized even though at the time of
dissolution the husband enjoys no benefits therefrom and in
fact may never complete the education. In the latter case, of
course, the "community interest" would be of no values" where
the professional education is not completed, much as Mrs.
Due's interests in her husband's contingency fee contracts are
worthless if the actions do not succeed.
Partition of the Community Professional Education
The preceding section has demonstrated how part or all of
the property right in a professional education may be classified
as community property. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out,
the courts may run into problems if they try to partition this
asset in settlement of property rights, since an education is
evidently not partitionable in kind or by licitation.5 5
It is submitted, however, that the provisons dealing with
judicial partition should be read in conjunction with article
240611 of the Civil Code in order to reach an alternative method
of partition. Article 2406 provides that, upon dissolution, the
87. This is not to say that the education one receives short of a professional
degree cannot enhance his earning potential. A year or two of law school, for example,
could be quite valuable to a person in securing a higher-paying job in business. How-
ever, recalling that the basic premise of this paper equates professional "education"
with a professional "degree" or "license," it is submitted that any education falling
short of the ultimate goal of a degree or license should not be recognized as "property."
A year of law school, for example, does not confer any "existing or potential right" and
thus is not a patrimonial asset, regardless of any practical value that the education
may confer.
88. See text at notes 13-15, supra.
89. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2406 provides:
The effects which compose the partnership or community of gains, are
divided into two equal portions between the husband and the wife, or between
their heirs, at the dissolution of the marriage; and it is the same with respect to
the profits arising from the effects which both husband and wife brought recipro-
cally in marriage, and which have been administered by the husband, or by
husband and wife conjointly, although what has been thus brought in marriage,
by either the husband or the wife, be more considerable than what has been
brought by the other, or even although one of the two did not bring anything at
all.
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"effects" which compose the community of gains "are divided
into two equal portions between the husband and the wife." 0
This language is susceptible of the interpretation that, as Pro-
fessor Pascal has noted, each spouse upon dissolution is enti-
tled to "realize his interest in terms of half the assets rather
than a half interest in all of them."'" Thus, reading article 2406
together with the partition provisions of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure,' 2 one may be justified in concluding that, in a situation
such as this one where certain property may not be partitioned
in kind or by licitation, the alternative is to apply article 2406
and recognize each spouse as owner of half the assets. This
approach would basically be equivalent to the "aggregate
theory" in that the student spouse could, for example, be
"awarded" his education and a community automobile while
the supporting spouse would receive other community property
which is equal in value to the husband's awarded assets. Of
course, this determination must be based upon a valuation of
the professional education, which is the subject of the following
section.
Valuation of the Community Professional Education
Not only is a valuation needed in order to effectuate a
judicial partition, but it is also necessary in that, to be a patri-
monial asset, and thus property, the professional education
must be susceptible of pecuniary evaluation.
As mentioned previously, an analogy may be drawn in this
regard to personal injury claims in which courts are frequently
called upon to establish values for loss of prospective earnings.
Louisiana courts have noted that damages for loss of future
earnings are proper even though they are somewhat speculative
in character. 3 In such cases, the valuation is made by the trier
of fact based upon all of the circumstances of the parties. 4
Obviously, the true value of the professional education lies in
90. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2406.
91. Pascal, Updating Louisiana's Community of Gains, 49 TuL. L. REV. 555, 580
(1975) (emphasis in original).
92. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 4601-08.
93. Robinson v. Graves, 343 So. 2d 147 (La. 1977).
94. Richardson v. DeVille, 204 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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the graduate's increase in earning potential, which is simply a
determinant in "prospective earnings." There is no reason why
a Louisiana court should evaluate the loss to the community
in the form of damages when the graduate spouse is killed, yet
refuse to evaluate the related value to the community in the
form of a partition of property rights when the community is
dissolved other than by death.
The point of the preceding discussion is that the profes-
sional education can be valued, not that the actual value of the
education upon dissolution of the community other than by
death should be the same as the value of lost potential earnings
when the community is dissolved by death. As mentioned
above, the circumstances of the case determine the valuation.
Certainly the recognition of the community's interest in future
earnings is based upon the assumption that the community
would have continued had the spouse not been killed or disa-
bled, and thus, his earnings would have been community prop-
erty. The circumstances are quite different when, for example,
the community is terminated by divorce so that the spouse's
future earnings would be his separate property. It should be
noted, however, that an evaluation of the professional degree
in terms of future earnings is not an attempt to improperly
partition future separate earnings; the evaluation merely rec-
ognizes earning potential as the value to which the spouses
originally looked in making the investment of community labor
and funds.
What are some of the circumstances which should be con-
sidered by the trial judge in determining the value of the pro-
fessional education? In addition to life expectancy and the
earning capacity associated with the profession, both of which
may be established by expert testimony, it is submitted that
two additional criteria should be considered.
First, and most importantly, the judge should recognize
that the value of the education to the graduate spouse de-
creases over time as he builds up practice experience. For ex-
ample, it can hardly be said that the earning potential of a
lawyer with twenty-five years experience is based to any signifi-
cant degree upon his formal education. Thus, in a situation
where the community is dissolved at such a time, the remain-
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ing value of the professional education will be insignificant,
and possibly zero. In addition, even if the community is dis-
solved shortly after the completion of the student spouse's edu-
cation, it is plain that the value of the professional education
is not equal to the full value of the spouse's earning capacity,
because the earning capacity is a function of education and
experience, with the importance of the education diminishing
over time.
The second major consideration should be the extent of
other community assets at the time of dissolution. If, for exam-
ple, the community is dissolved after fifteen years and the
assets of the community are substantial due primarily to the
professional success of the "student spouse," perhaps, as the
Kentucky court noted in the Inman case, 5 the community will
in fact have realized the value of the professional education.
By way of summarizing the discussion up to this point,
assume the following hypothetical. Husband and wife are mar-
ried after the first year of husband's three-year legal education.
Wife earns $600 per month working at a bank to support the
husband in his last two years of law school. Six months after
his graduation, at which time he is gainfully employed, hus-
band abandons wife. Shortly thereafter, wife gets a separation
from bed and board" and seeks a judicial partition of com-
munity property. However, at this time, the spouses have yet
to accumulate any significant assets.
It is clear that in such a situation the property interest in
the professional education is the only significant asset of the
community. Inasmuch as two-thirds of the asset was acquired
during the existence of the community, the community is enti-
tled to two-thirds of the value of the education. The supporting
spouse will then be entitled to her one-half share. Assume that
the trial judge determines that the value of the education, in
light of all the circumstances, is $18,000.11 Under the concepts
95. See text at notes 35-39, supra.
96. Louisiana Civil Code article 138(5) provides that abandonment is cause for
a separation from bed and board.
97. This is the actual figure determined by the Iowa trial court in In re Marriage
of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978), to be the value of a legal education under
similar factual circumstances.
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discussed earlier,98 the judge could "award" the $18,000 educa-
tion to the student spouse and award $18,000-worth of other
assets to award the wife. It is submitted that, in this situation,
the court could order the student spouse to pay one-half of the
community's $12,000 share of the education, or $6,000, to the
supporting spouse, either in a lump sum or over time, in settle-
ment of her property rights. This solution is reached through
analogy to the Sims and Due cases99 in that the court is empow-
ered to recognize a spouse's community rights even though
those rights may not be susceptible of satisfaction at the time
of the rendition of the judgment. Thus, the fact that the
spouses had yet to realize sufficient assets in order for the judge
to allow a set-off of assets under article 2406 should not preju-
dice the supporting spouse's right to have her property interests
recognized and eventually satisfied.
Conclusion
The purpose of this comment has been to demonstrate
that, as a patrimonial asset, a professional education is a prop-
erty right which may be classified as community property
under appropriate circumstances. Such a determination is nec-
essary in order to protect the supporting spouse'00 and to avoid
the "windfall of contribution" to the earning capacity of the
student spouse. Though the property right arising from a pro-
fessional education is admittedly somewhat theoretical in na-
ture, "traditional notions of what constitutes 'property' "101
9
98. See text at note 88, supra.
99. See text at notes 85-87, supra.
100. At least one court has recognized that the supporting spouse's interests may
be protected by considering the student spouse's increased earning potential in award-
ing alimony. Colvert v. Colvert, 568 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977). In Louisiana, earning
capacity is certainly relevant in determining alimony awards, as an element of "ability
to pay." It should be emphasized, however, that the patrimonial nature of a profes-
sional education requires its recognition as "property" by the courts of this state, and
that any attempt to circumvent this result by an adjustment of alimony awards should
be ineffective. Nevertheless, courts should be aware of the interrelationship of property
distributions and alimony awards in these cases due to the common "earning capacity"
element, and should be careful that there is no "double dipping," i.e., that the support-
ing spouse does not realize the value of the investment's earning capacity in both
awards.
101. See note 41, supra.
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should not be viewed as being too narrow' 2 to extend to the
education since, as has been shown, it is a valuable patrimonial
asset. It is time that the courts become sensitive to the eco-
nomic realities of an investment in a professional education.
James Joseph Sullivan
102. In Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977), the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated that the term "property" is used "in the broad sense of the term" in determining
that property which should be classified as community property. Id. at 165 (emphasis
added).
